Abstract. In this paper, the Nash equilibrium strategy of two-person zero-sum games with heptagonal fuzzy payoffs is considered and the existence of Nash equilibrium strategy is studied. Also, based on the fuzzy max order several models in heptagonal fuzzy environment is constructed and the existence of their equilibrium strategies is proposed. In the sequel, the existence of Pareto Nash equilibrium strategies and weak Pareto Nash equilibrium strategies is investigated for fuzzy matrix games. Finally, the relation between Pareto Nash equilibrium strategy and parametric bi-matrix games is established.
Introduction
Modern game theory was developed by the mathematician John Von Neumann in the Mid-1940's and in 1944, he published the book of "Theory of games and economic behavior" joint with Morgenstern [9] .
The most important categories are as cooperative and non-cooperative games. In 1951, non-cooperative games was presented by John Nash [8] . In this article we focus on a class of non-cooperative games namely two-person zero-sum matrix games. Moreover, one of the most important concepts in game theory is the Nash equilibrium. Nash proves that if we approve mixed strategies, then every game with a finite number of players has at least one Nash equilibrium.
In 1978, the idea of fuzziness was exhibited by Zadeh [15] , that is a type of subjective uncertainty. After then fuzzy numbers found many applications in various fields with incomplete information such as engineering, social and economics. In many science such as economics, business competition, auction and etc., the payoff for games is not realistic indeed the payoffs are fuzzy.
Many of mathematicians and reseachers study the fuzziness. Zimmermann [16] in 1985, Yazenin [13] in 1987 and Sakawa [12] in 1993 applied the fuzzy theory to optimization problems. In 1989, Campos [2] transformed the fuzzy games into fuzzy optimization problems. In 1999, Liu [5] founded theory in the uncertain environments. In 2000, Meada [7] constructed kind of concepts of minimax equilibrium strategies.
In 2005, C. R. Bector and S. Chandra [1] provided fuzzy mathematical programming and fuzzy matrix games.
In 2011, Cunlin and Zhang Qiang [4] investigated two-person zero-sum games in the symmetric triangular fuzzy environment. They obtained Nash equilibrium of two-person zero-sum games with fuzzy payoff. They also obtained Pareto Nash equilibrium strategy for fuzzy matrix game. In 2014, Bapi Dutta [3] extended their work in trapezoidal fuzzy environment and he introduced two special types of fuzzy games: constant and proportional fuzzy game. In [3, 4, 7] the uncertainty and imprecision in payoffs have been represented by either triangular or trapezoidal fuzzy numbers.
The most frequently used fuzzy numbers in the different problems are triangular or trapezoidal fuzzy numbers. But, it is not possible to restrict the membership functions to take either triangular or trapezoidal form.
Therefore this paper focus on fuzzy payoffs of decision makers by heptagonal fuzzy numbers. In 2014, the arithmetic operations of heptagonal fuzzy numbers are defined by K. Rathi and S. Balamohan [10] . The heptagonal fuzzy number gives additional possibility to represent imperfect knowledge what leads to model many problems. Heptagonal fuzzy numbers have different applications in optimization problems and decision making problems which need seven parameters.
In this paper we define the k-heptagonal fuzzy numbers and generalize Cunlin and Qiang [4] and Bapi Dutta [3] Nash equilibrium solution concepts. The paper is organized as follows: In section 2, the basic definitions and notations of fuzzy numbers are given. In section 3, we introduce the notation of two-person zero-sum matrix games with heptagonal fuzzy payoffs, the different types of equilibrium strategies and investigate their existence conditions for the fuzzy games. In section 4, parametric bi-matrix games are introduced and then the relation between parametric bi-matrix games and Nash equilibrium strategies is studied. In section 5, we present some illustrative exampes.
Preliminaries
In this section, we suggest some basic definitions and concepts of fuzzy numbers, which were proposed by Zadeh [14] in 1965. Also, we introduce some notations of fuzzy sets, such as α-cut for heptagonal fuzzy numbers.
satisfies the following conditions. 
. For more details see [4, 6] .
where c is the center ofã and h, l, r, m are non-negative.
In the rest of the paper, for simplicity, the k-heptagonal fuzzy number is denoted by k-HFN.
• Subtraction:ã
• Scalar Multiplication :
By definition of α-cut we have the following lemma.
.., ξ n ) and y = (η 1 , η 2 , ..., η n ) be vectors in R n . Then 
The following theorem characterize the orders for heptagonal fuzzy numbers.
(ii)ã ≺b if and only if
Proof. By using Definition (2.4)ã b if and only if for all α
and
which are equivalent to max{h 2 − h 1 , 0} ≤ a 2 − a 1 and max{m 1 − m 2 , 0} ≤ b 2 − b 1 . Similarly, by using Lemma(2.1) it can be conclude a 
Two-person Zero-sum Matrix Fuzzy Games
In this section, we shall consider two-person zero-sum games with fuzzy payoffs. Let P = {1, 2, ..., p} and Q = {1, 2, ..., q} be the sets of pure strategies of player I and player II , respectively. Let A = (a ij ) p×q be the payoff matrix whose entries a ij denote the payoff that player I gains and player II loses. In the zero-sum games −a ij is the amount paid by player I to player II i.e. the gain of one player is the loss of other player.
The mixed strategies of players I and player II are probability distributions on the set of pure strategies, represented by
respectively.
In this section, the payoffs of the pair (x, y) ∈ X × Y are modeled by k-heptagonal fuzzy numberã = (a, c, b, h, l, r, m). Let player I choose a mixed strategy x ∈ X and player II choose mixed strategy y ∈ Y .
The k-heptagonal fuzzy numberã ij = (a ij , c ij , b ij , h ij , l ij , r ij , m ij ) indicates the payoffs that player I receives and player II loses, the fuzzy payoff matrix of the game is given bỹ
The fuzzy two-person zero-sum games is denoted byΓ ≡ (X, Y,Ã). The fuzzy payoffs of the players I and II are
which is a k-heptagonal fuzzy number, for more details see [11] . In the rest of this paper, we setÃ =
AlsoÃ is a fuzzy k-heptagonal payoff matrix.
Theorem 3.1. LetΓ = (X, Y,Ã) be a two-person zero-sum game with fuzzy payoffs, the pair (x * , y * ) is the expected Nash Equilibrium strategy ofΓ if and only if :
Proof. LetΓ be a two-person zero-sum game with the fuzzy k-heptagonsl payoff matrixÃ = (A, C, B, H, L, R, M ).
Let (x * , y * ) ∈ X × Y be the Nash equilibrium strategy of the gameΓ. Therefore by Definition (3.1) we have
So, by Theorem (2.1), x TÃ y * x * TÃ y * if and only if
Consequently x TÃ y * x * TÃ y * if and only if
2)
Also, since
similary by Theorem (2.1), x * TÃ y * x * TÃ y if and only if
Now, from (3.1) and (3.5) we get
from (3.2) and (3.6) we obtain
from (3.3) and (3.8) we have
and from (3.4) and (3.8) we get
Hence, we have the required inequalities (i)-(vii).
In the rest of the paper, we purpose the following notations:
where A, C, B, H, L, R, M are the p×q matrix. Using these notations Theorem(3.1) can be rewrite as follows.
Corollary 3.1. LetΓ be a two-person zero-sum game with fuzzy payoffs, the pair (x * , y * ) is the Nash Equilibrium strategy ofΓ if and only if the followings hold
In the view of Theorem 3.1, we understand that to solve the fuzzy gameΓ, it is enough to consider seven crisp two-person zero-sum games and attempt to determine a point (x * , y * ) ∈ X × Y which is simultaneously a saddle point of them. The following corollary is a direct result of Theorem(3.2).
Corollary 3.2. LetÃ = (ã ij ) be a payoff matrix of proportional fuzzy gameΓ. Suppose that b ij = γ 5 a ij , c ij = γ 6 a ij for all i, j with γ 5 , γ 6 ≥ 1. Then a pair of mixed strategies (x * , y * ) ∈ X × Y is the Nash equilibrium strategy forΓ if and only if (x * , y * ) is a Nash equilibrium of crisp two-person zero-sum game Γ a = (X, Y, A). (ii) there does not exist any y ∈ Y such that x * TÃ y x * TÃ y * .
Theorem 3.3. LetΓ ≡ (X, Y,Ã) be a fuzzy two-person zero-sum game. A pair (x * , y * ) ∈ X × Y is the Pareto Nash equilibrium strategy for the gameΓ if and only if
Proof. By contradiction, let (x * , y * ) ∈ X × Y be the Pareto Nash equilibrium strategy ofΓ. Assume that there exist x 1 ∈ X such that following relationships are established
It implies that
But, by Definition (2.3) the above inequalities do not occur simultaneously. Therefore, we get
for α ∈ [0, k] and obtain
. By rearranging, it follows that
Using Definition (3.4) it implies that x * TÃ y * x T 1Ã y * . This is a contradiction.
Conversely, we assume that the pair of mixed strategy (x * , y * ) ∈ X × Y be satisfy (3.9) and (3.10). Suppose that there exists a strategy
This is contradict (i). Similarly, we can show that there does not exist any y ∈ Y such that x * TÃ y x * TÃ y * .
Then proof of the Theorem is complete. Definition 3.5. A pair of mixed strategies (x * , y * ) ∈ X × Y is a weak Pareto Nash equilibrium strategy of the gameΓ if
(ii) there does not exist any y ∈ Y such that x * TÃ y ≺ x * TÃ y * .
Following theorem is obtaine directly from Definition (3.5) and Theorem (3.3).
Theorem 3.4. LetΓ ≡ (X, Y,Ã) be a fuzzy two-person zero-sum game. A pair (x * , y * ) ∈ X × Y is the weak Pareto Nash equilibrium strategy for the gameΓ if and only if
Parametric Bi-Matrix Games
In this section we characterize parametric bi-matrix games and investigate other types of Nash equilibrium strategies for parametric bi-matrix games. Let S p = {η 1 , η 2 , ..., η p } and S q = {ξ 1 , ξ 2 , ..., ξ q } be sets of pure strategies of player I and player II , respectively. We set U = (u ij ) p×q to be payoffs matrices of player I and V = (V ij ) p×q to be payoffs matrices of player II , respectively. Suppose β, γ ∈ [0, 1] and let 
Now, we consider the parametric bi-matrix game Γ(β, γ) = (X, Y, A(β), A(γ)).
Definition 4.1.
[8] Let Γ(β, γ) be a parametric bi-matrix game. A pair of mixed strategies (x * , y * ) ∈ X × Y is a Nash equilibrium strategy of Γ if
Theorem 4.1. Let Γ(β, γ) be a prametric bi-matrix game and the pair of mixed strategy (x * , y * ) ∈ X ×Y be Nash equilibrium strategy of Γ. Then (x * , y * ) ∈ X × Y is the Pareto Nash equilibrium strategy of the fuzzy two-person zero-sum gameΓ.
Proof. Let (x * , y * ) ∈ X × Y be the Nash equilibrium strategy of the parametric bi-matrix game Γ(β, γ),
. By Definition (4.1) we obtain
In order to show that (x * , y * ) ∈ X × Y is Pareto Nash equilibrium strategy ofΓ, we have to prove that there
Moreover, by Definition (2.3)
do not occur simultaneously. Then we have
Theorem 4.2. Let the pair of mixed strategies (x * , y * ) ∈ X × Y be Nash equilibrium strategy of prametric bi-matrix game Γ(β, γ) with β, γ ∈ [0, 1]. Then (x * , y * ) ∈ X × Y is the weak Pareto Nash equilibrium strategy of fuzzy two-person zero-sum gameΓ.
The following corollary is direct result of Theorem (4.1) and Theorem (4.2).
Corollary 4.1. A fuzzy two-person zero-sum gameΓ satisfies the following properties:
(i) There exsist at least one Pareto Nash equilibrium strategy of fuzzy gameΓ,
(ii) There exsist at least one weak Pareto Nash equilibrium strategy of fuzzy gameΓ. It is easy to obtain that the Nash equilibrium strategy of the crisp matrix game Γ a is (x * , y * ) = ( Find the Nash equilibrium strategy for the gameΓ.
Illustrative Examples
by definition(3.3)Γ is a proportional fuzzy game and h = 10, l = 15, r = 10 and m = 40. Let x * T = p, 1 − p and y * T = q, 1 − q be the mixed strategy of player I and II , respectively. By Theorm(3.1),
it is easy to show that the Nash equilibrium strategy ofΓ is (x * , y * ) = ( Find the Nash, Pareto Nash and weak Pareto Nash equilibrium strategy of the gameΓ.
Let x * T = p, 1 − p and y * T = q, 1 − q be the mixed strategy of player I and II , respectively. Since there is no (x, y) ∈ X × Y satisfying the conditions of Theorem(3.1), so there is no Nash equilibrium strategy for the gameΓ. By Theorem(4.2) to finding the Pareto Nash equilibrium strategy, it is enough to find the Nash equilibrium strategy of parametric bi-matrix gameΓ. So, we construct the bi-matrix game Γ(β, γ) from fuzzy matrix gameΓ. Using relations (4.1) and (4.2) we obtain Thus for β, γ ∈ [0, 1] , Nash equilibrium strategy for the parametric game Γ(β, γ) are as follows 
